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Abstract. This paper introduces a dynamic model of productivity measurement based on 
recent endogenous growth theories. These theories have found that continuous growth is 
possible because of the existence of non-rival factors of production that are external to 
the firms. Two necessary conditions for this hypothesized endogenous growth are: 
increasing returns to scale over all inputs and positive impacts of external factors on the 
returns to investment.  
The model presented in this study is based on dynamic duality theory and incorporates 
public goods (public capital and R&D) as external factors to the firms. It also rationalizes 
the provision of public inputs by a benevolent social planner that internalizes the effects 
of them. Moreover, the Le Chatelier principle is extended for this dynamic duality model 
in which the public factors are quasi-fixed for the firm and all firm-specific inputs can be 
adjusted in the long run. Therefore, increasing returns to scale over all inputs can still be 
tested at the long-run equilibrium perceived by the firm. Additionally, this model permits 
deriving testable hypotheses related to the two conditions of endogenous growth theory 
mentioned above.  
The model is tested with data for the U.S. agricultural sector. Theoretically consistent 
firms’ dynamic demands for inputs are estimated including stocks of public capital and 
R&D as quasi-fixed factors. The effects of these variables on intertemporal costs are 
expected to be negative. Economies of scale are obtained if the estimated elasticity of 
cost with respect to output is less than one. Moreover, public inputs are expected to 
increase the steady state stocks of private capital, stimulating in this way private 
investment.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey) have been widely criticized because 
they cannot explain productivity changes. According to these models, growth is exogenously 
given by an unexplained rate of technical change. As a response, endogenous growth theories 
prove that continuous growth is possible because of the existence of non-rival inputs of 
production (i.e., inputs that can be used by many firms at the same time or by the same firm 
repeatedly without additional cost). In these models, two necessary conditions for endogenous 
growth are: increasing returns to scale over all inputs, and positive impacts of non-rival inputs 
on the returns to investment. The main contribution of this study is to introduce a dynamic 
model of productivity measurement that incorporates public goods (non-rival by definition) as 
external factors to the firms. It also rationalizes the provision of public inputs by a benevolent 
social planner that internalizes the effects of them. Estimable functions that allow testing the 
necessary conditions for endogenous growth are obtained. 
Many other papers have focused on the effects of public goods on private production, 
and most of them have found positive impacts
1. For example, Aschauer’s (1989) pioneer work 
estimates a single production function for the U.S. economy including public infrastructure as 
a factor of production. Lynde and Richmond (1992) and Berndt and Hansson (1992) have also 
used duality theory to estimate the role of infrastructure in private production in the U.S. and 
Sweden, respectively. Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) estimate the impacts of public capital and 
research and development (R&D) on the cost structure of twelve U.S. manufacturing 
industries, and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) study the regional effects of public 
infrastructure on the U.S. manufacturing sector. Both papers adopt a dual approach and find, 
in general, positive effects of public inputs on manufacturing productivity. The last paper also 
finds increasing returns to scale over all inputs (including infrastructure), but it does not 
include R&D.  
For the agricultural sector, papers like Antle (1983) and Craig et al. (1997) find 
positive effects of public infrastructure and research on agricultural productivity but their 
approach is based on estimating a single production function. Binswanger et al. (1993) 
estimates the impacts of infrastructure and R&D in India. They consider, in a static 
framework, that public infrastructure investments are regionally allocated toward areas that 
are more productive. In contrast, the present study develops a dynamic model of productivity 
                                                 
1 Exceptions are Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) and Holtz-Eakin (1994). They find insignificant effects of 
public infrastructure on private production. 
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measurement. This approach, based on duality theory, maintains producer rationality and 
allows examination of the impacts of public inputs on producer’s behavior. 
The model is tested with data for the U.S. agricultural sector. United States 
agricultural productivity has increased at an annual average rate of two percent over the 1948-
1994 period. Some authors have found that productivity growth has been the main factor 
contributing to economic growth of the agricultural sector (Ball et al., 1997). Additionally, the 
provision of public goods in the form of public research and extension, and infrastructure has 
been sizable in this country. In an atomistic environment, these public expenditures are 
traditionally justified because of their low degree of appropriability and high costs. 
Theoretically consistent firms’ dynamic demands for inputs are then estimated for U.S. 
agriculture including stocks of public capital and R&D as quasi-fixed factors. The existence 
of economies of scale and the likely positive impact of public inputs on the steady state stocks 
of private capital can be tested. 
There are several reasons to undertake this study. First, the possibility of endogenous 
growth in the agricultural sector may imply spillovers to other sectors and, in particular, may 
have important effects on the growth of regional economies based on agricultural activities. 
Second, Ball et al. (1997) show the increasing use of materials and the decreasing use of labor 
in the U.S. agricultural sector. Then, by determining the substitution or complementarity 
between public and private inputs, one may explain the findings by Ball et al. with respect to 
this evolution of quantities demanded of private factors. Finally, the estimation of shadow 
prices for public capital and R&D stocks may provide an indicator to policy makers of the 
optimal provision of public investment. 
This paper develops as follows. Section II presents a summary of the endogenous 
growth theory involving publicly provided goods and the related testable hypotheses using a 
dual approach. Section III introduces a dynamic model in which both producers’ and 
government’s behaviors are rationalized. The testable hypotheses are then revisited. Section 
IV introduces the empirical model and section V presents the preliminary results. Finally, 
conclusions and future lines of research are stated in section VI. 
 
 
II.  Growth Theory and Testable Hypothesis 
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In the neoclassical models of growth (Solow, Ramsey), the rate of growth of per capita 
output is a decreasing function of the per capita stock of private capital. Without technical 
change and with a well-behaved neoclassical production function, the level of per capita 
output converges to a steady state where the growth of per capita private capital eventually 
stops. This result, implied by the assumption of decreasing returns to capital, has been one of 
the major criticisms to these models. 
As a response to these empirically unsustainable results, endogenous growth theory 
arose proposing different hypotheses. These theories incorporate into the models the reasons 
for technical change to occur based on the presence of externalities that originate 
nonconvexities. 
Nonconvexities play an important role in new theories of growth. They are generally 
due to the presence of nonrival goods. Following Romer (1990), nonrivalry can be interpreted 
in two ways. First, nonrival factors of production are valuable “inputs that can be used 
simultaneously in more than one activity.” Under this definition, public goods, like public 
infrastructure for instance, are nonrival inputs that can be used by many producers at the same 
time. Alternatively, one can define a nonrival input as that input that can be used repeatedly in 
the same activity. With this definition, a new chemical process, for example, is an input that 
can be used more than once in the production of a certain product. In this case, nonconvexities 
are intrinsically associated to this input: there is a high cost of producing the first unit, but the 
cost of producing subsequent units is zero. In any case, since the presence of nonrival inputs 
generates nonconvexities, the production function can be characterized by increasing returns 
to scale: 
0   with  ), N , R ( F ) N , R ( F ) N , R ( F > λ λ = λ > λ λ  
 
where R and N stand for rival input and nonrival inputs, respectively. Thus, if rival and 
nonrival inputs are doubled (λ = 2), output is more than doubled. 
One of the pioneer studies in the endogenous growth literature has been that by Romer 
(1986). In this paper, Romer specifies a production function F(ki, K, xi), with ki and xi being 
firm-specific inputs (x can be seen as a vector of inputs) and K an input external to the firm, 
like “the level of knowledge” defined as a function of the “firm-specific knowledge” 
(K=g(Σki)). If F is increasing in K and linearly homogeneous in ki and xi, a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium is still possible, but the factor ki no longer exhibits diminishing 
returns. Consequently, permanent endogenous growth of output per capita is allowed. 
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Barro (1990) has developed a similar model where K can be interpreted as the stock of 
public capital (hereafter G). The intuition is that publicly provided capital (like roads, sewer 
capital, etc.) has a positive impact on private production affecting the productivity of the firm-
specific inputs. Public capital is assumed a public input that can be used by additional 
producers without cost. Consequently, total stocks of public goods enter into the production 
function of each individual firm. In this context, two necessary conditions for the 
hypothesized endogenous growth are: existence of increasing returns to scale over all inputs, 
and existence of constant returns to scale over factors that can be accumulated (private and 
public capital). This second condition implies that private capital is continuously accumulated 
and there is an optimal ratio between private to public capital. A weaker requirement, 
alternative to this condition, would be a positive impact of G on the demand for capital. 
Although not ensuring continuous growth, the presence of this nonrival input would imply a 
positive government’s contribution to growth.  
The conditions mentioned above (i.e., increasing returns to scale over all inputs and 
positive impact of public inputs on private capital accumulation) can be rationalized using the 
theory of the firm. The following section introduces a model in which firms respond to 
changes in public inputs provided by a benevolent social planner. Estimable functions that 
allow testing for the hypothesized endogenous growth conditions are then obtained in a model 
that maintains producer rationality. 
 
 
III.  The Model 
 
A dynamic dual model of the firm is used to explain growth based on the existence of 
public inputs. As was hypothesized, public goods might have positive effects on firms’ 
production. If the dual problem of the firms is considered, public inputs reduce cost of 
production given the level of firms’ output. In this manner, increases of public inputs increase 
firms’ productivity. 
The model assumes that economic agents are intertemporal optimizers: firms minimize 
intertemporal costs of production and the government (social planner) maximizes 
intertemporal welfare. Instantaneous adjustment of inputs is not possible because of the 
existence of costs of adjustment. 
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In their optimizing behavior, firms take public inputs as given. Public inputs are 
considered quasi-fixed inputs of production in that they cannot be adjusted to obtain the 
minimum possible cost. However, the government, behaving as a social planner, observes the 
producers’ surplus and provides public goods to maximize this surplus, subject to the cost of 
providing the public inputs.  
The model adopted in this paper assumes that the government knows the payoff 
function of the firms. This assumption implies that the government knows how the firms react 
when public inputs are changed, i.e. the government behaves as a ‘leader’ and optimizes first. 
Then, firms take the level of public inputs as given and choose private inputs such that their 
costs of production are minimized. 












G represents the stock of the public input. K is the stock of private capital. Three 
average cost curves (faced by the firms) are shown in the graph. ACS(Gt, Kt) represents a very 
short-run average cost curve when private inputs (capital in this case) and public inputs are 
fixed. ACS(Gt) is the short-run average cost curve when only public inputs are fixed. Finally, 
ACL is the long-run average cost curve when all inputs are adjusted. 
At each period t, the firms observe the public input stock G and choose the optimal 
path of investment (I) that allows them to reach the optimal steady state (SS) stock K*. 
Starting at E0 and with a stock of public inputs G0, firms choose an optimal path of I that 
allows the firm to reach K0
* at the minimum cost. The firm moves from E0 to E
’
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adjusted the next period when the stock G1 implies a new SS stock K1
*. The firm then moves 
to E1. The two conditions for the hypothesized endogenous growth of the firms can then be 
seen in the graph: 
I.  Increasing returns to scale over the long-run average cost curve (ACL): negative slope 
of ACL. 
II.  Positive effects of G on the SS stocks of the private capital (i.e. the private input “that 
can be accumulated”): the SS stock of K increases from K0
* to K1
* when G grows 
from G0 to G1. 
More formally, firms solve the following problem: 
t        0 ) t ( Z                               
Z ) 0 ( Z                               
Z I Z   to   subject               












      ( 1 )  
where C(y, Z, I; G) is the variable cost function; y is the only output; Z is the vector of stocks 
of quasi-fixed inputs; p is the rental price vector corresponding to Z; I is the vector of gross 
changes in quasi-fixed inputs; δ is the diagonal matrix containing the depreciation rates of Z; 
G is the vector of public inputs; and ρ > 0 is the firm’s real rate of discount. It is assumed that 
there is one perfectly variable input whose price (w) is normalized to one.
2 Thus, the elements 
of p are relative rental prices. 
Define now J(Z, y, p; G) as the value function that solves problem (1). Assuming that 
C(y, Z, I; G) satisfies the set of regularity conditions (A.1) – (A.6) and J(Z, y, p;G) satisfies 
properties (B1) – (B5) (see Appendix 1), duality between C(y, Z, I; G) and J(Z, y, p; G) can 
be established. 
 
Duality between C(y, Z, I; G) and J(Z, y, p; G):
3 any J( Z, y, p; G.) satisfying conditions (B) is 
the value function corresponding to C(y, Z, I; G) that satisfies conditions (A) and is defined by 
 
)] Z I )( G ; p , y , Z ( ' J Z ' p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J [ Max ) G ; I , Z , y ( C z
p δ − − − ρ =      (2) 
                                                 
2 Given w = 1, the variable cost function is C(1, y, Z, I; G). For simplification, C(1, y, Z, I; G) = C(y, Z, I; G) is 
used. 
3 Epstein (1983). 
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or 
)] Z I )( G ; p , y , Z ( ' J Z ' p ) G ; I , Z , y ( C [ Min ) G ; p , y , Z ( J z I δ − + + = ρ      (3) 
 
These two equations provide the relationship between the cost function C(y, Z, I; G) 
and the value function J(Z, y, p; G). They allow obtaining the properties of C(y, Z, I; G) in 
terms of the parameters of J(Z, y, p; G) when firms minimize intertemporal costs. Thus, the 
derivative properties that characterize C(y, Z, I; G) can be recovered from the parameters of 
J(Z, y, p; G).
4 Therefore, the two previously mentioned endogenous growth conditions can be 
tested through estimation of parameters of J(Z, y, p; G). 
 
Conditions for Endogenous Growth 
1)  The impact of G on 
a)  The cost function: this is provided by the fifth derivative property explained in the 
Appendix 1. The following expression represents this effect: 
) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C ZG G G
•
− ρ =  
which is the shadow price of G when the firms are out of the SS. At the SS, the 
shadow price is 
) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C G G ρ =  
If this expression is negative, the shadow price of G is positive, meaning that public 
inputs reduce cost of production. 
b)  The dynamic demand for private capital: it can be shown that the dynamic demand for 
the quasi-fixed inputs Z can be expressed as 




                  (4) 
where   is the SS stock of Z and M(p,G) is a stable adjustment matrix. This 
expression yields a flexible accelerator adjustment path for the stocks Z and is the 
reason for these dynamic models to be called “multivariate flexible accelerator 
models” (Epstein(1983)). The form of M(p,G) is determined by the functional form of 
) G , p ( Z
_
                                                 
4 See Appendix for the derivative properties. 
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C(y, Z, I); however, only under certain conditions, it can be successfully expressed as 
an explicit function of the parameters of C(y, Z, I).
5
The effect of G on the dynamic demand for Z can then be decomposed in the effect on 
the adjustment matrix and the effect on the SS stock of Z. The condition for 
endogenous growth would be for G to increase the SS stock of private capital K (one 
of the quasi-fixed factors of the firms). The effect on the adjustment matrix is only an 
effect on the speed of adjustment toward the SS. However, it is still required for this 
adjustment to be stable. 
2)  Scale Effects: there must be increasing returns to scale over all factors of production 
(public and private factors). Increasing returns to scale can be evaluated by considering 
the elasticity of cost with respect to output (εCY). It is well known in the production 
economics literature that the elasticity of cost with respect to output is the dual expression 




 This approach is 
extended here for the case of intertemporal optimization. 
When the elasticity of cost with respect to output 
is less than one, firms exhibit economies of scale. However, in the presence of factors 
external to the firm, some adjustments should be made in order to obtain ε . Morrison and 
Schwartz (1996) show how to adjust the elasticity of cost with respect to output when 
there are quasi-fixed inputs in a static cost minimization framework.
7
Define the shadow price of the public input PG = PG(Z, y, p; G). This shadow price can 
be interpreted as an “inverse demand” for the public input. Solving for G, given PG, gives 
the direct shadow demand for G that can be substituted into (4) to get 
)] Z I ))( p , y , Z , P ( G ; p , y , Z ( J











− − ρ =
               (5) 
                                                 
5 See Epstein (1983) for details. 
6 See Chambers (1988) for details. 
7 The approach is based on Le Chatelier principle. Taking the derivative with respect to Y on both sides of the 
identity C
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Taking the derivative with respect to y, we obtain the adjusted effect of output on cost 
when the ‘shadow demand’ for G also changes with firms’ output: 











− ρ + − ρ =
∂
∂
                       (6a) 
At the SS, this expression becomes 
b) 6  (                                                            ) p , y , Z , P ( G C C



















Completing elasticities gives the following equation 




CY                (7) 
which is the elasticity of cost with respect to output adjusted for the presence of public 
quasi-fixed inputs. Note that εCG is the elasticity of cost with respect to external factors, 
and εGY is the elasticity of “demand for external factors” with respect to output. This 
demand elasticity should be interpreted as a long-run one representing the change in 
external factors necessary to maintain the firm on the envelope long-run average cost 
curve after a change in output. Therefore, if 
A
CY ε  is less than one, then there are increasing 
returns to scale over all inputs. 
 
Government Behavior 
As already mentioned, the government behaves as a benevolent social planner. It 
provides public inputs to maximize welfare (producers’ and consumers’ surpluses less the cost 
of providing public inputs). A small open economy is assumed, so the output price is given. 
Assuming that public inputs do not affect utility of consumers, the problem of the government 
is reduced to the maximization of producers’ surplus. Then, in a dynamic model, the 
government solves the following problem 
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t        0 ) t ( G                               
G ) 0 ( G                               
G I G   to   subject               













     (8) 
 
where J(y, Z, p; G) is the value function of the firms that comes from their intertemporal cost 
minimization problem; Ig is the investment in public inputs which stocks are given by vector 
G; AC(Ig) is the government’s adjustment cost of G; δg is the diagonal matrix containing the 
depreciation rates of G; r is the rental price of G; and θ is the government’s rate of discount. 
The existence of adjustment costs is justified by the multiple activities the government does 
with given resources. Increasing Ig means that the government must reallocate funds and 
resources used in the provision of some other public goods, like goods that provide utility to 
consumers or are inputs for producers in other sectors. This reallocation of resources implies 




g(p, Z, y; r, G) as the government’s value function that solves (8). Assuming 
that J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) satisfies conditions (C.1) – (C.6) and J
g(p, Z, y; r,G) satisfies 
conditions (D.1) – (D.5) (see Appendix 2), duality between J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) and J
g(p, Z, 
y; r, G) can be established. 
 
Duality between J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) and J
g(p, Z, y; r, G): any J
g(p, Z, y; r, G) satisfying 
conditions (D) is the value function corresponding to J(Z, y, p; G) + AC(Ig) that satisfies 
conditions (C) and is defined by 





g δ − − − = + θ                 (9) 
or 





δ − + + + = θ               (10) 
 
                                                 
8 Note that assuming the objective functions of consumers and producers are separable with respect to the 
objective function of problem (8), the government can decide the optimal provision of different public goods 
separately. 
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These two expressions provide the relationship between J(Z, y, p; G), the value function of the 
firms, and J
g(p, Z, y; r, G), the value function of the government. They allow expressing the 
parameters of J(Z, y, p; G) in terms of the parameters of J
g(p, Z, y; r, G) and vice versa, when 
the government maximizes intertemporal welfare by minimizing producers’ cost. Thus, the 
derivative properties that characterize J(Z, y, p; G) can be recovered from the parameters of 
J
g(p, Z, y; r, G).
9
One interesting point is that the optimal provision of public inputs by the social 
planner is subject to the cost of it. The rental price r represents this opportunity cost, which 
can be interpreted as the cost of borrowing. When this cost is high, the average long-run curve 
that the government observes is not necessarily downward sloping. Therefore, there can be a 
steady state situation with low levels of K and G, and a situation similar to a ‘poverty trap’. In 
contrast, if the cost of financing public inputs is low, a steady state with high levels of K and 
G can be achieved. 
 
 
IV.  Empirical Implementation 
 
This section presents the empirical implementation of the model introduced above. 
Ideally, having data on r, the optimal path of Ig could be estimated. Nevertheless, the 
contribution of public capital and public R&D to U.S. agricultural growth and the conditions 
for the hypothesized endogenous growth can still be tested through estimation of the firms’ 
demands for private inputs. Adopting a flexible functional form for the value function of the 
firms, all parameters of interest can be recovered from the estimation of the dynamic demands 
for private quasi-fixed inputs and the demand for the variable input. 
The study covers the period 1948 – 1994. Variables needed for estimation include 
quantity indexes of capital (K), labor (L), materials (M), and output (Y); implicit prices of the 
three inputs; and stocks of quasi-fixed public inputs (public capital (G) and R&D (R)).
10 K is 
an aggregate measure of capital and land. Capital and labor are assumed quasi-fixed inputs, 
                                                 
9 See Appendix 2 for these derivative properties. 
10 See Ball et al. (1997) for details on all agricultural data. Public capital stocks are from Survey of Current 
Business and include buildings, highways, streets, sewer structures etc. Military structures are excluded. Public 
R&D spending is from Alston and Pardey (1996). 
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while materials are the only variable input.
11 Output is an index of all crops and livestock 
products. Public capital stocks are values of federal, state, and local structures. Public R&D 
stocks are constructed from R&D spending using Chavas and Cox’s method (1992).
12
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a ) , , ( J 0  (11) 
 
This is a second order Taylor series expansion of J in (P, Z, Q), where Z is the vector of quasi-
fixed factors, P is the corresponding vector of normalized rental prices, and Q is the vector of 
output and public inputs; Ai and Bij are parameter matrices of appropriate order; a0 is a scalar 
parameter. Then, the vectors P’, Z’, and Q’ are equal to 
 
[] [ ] [ ];         Q            Z            P Y R G ' ; L K ' ; P P ' L K = = =  
 
where PK and PL are the prices of capital and labor, respectively, normalized by the price of 
materials. 
The dynamic demands for quasi-fixed inputs are then
13,14
 
] ) , , ( J )[ , , ( J ) , , ( * p
1
pz Z Q Z P Q Z P Q Z P Z − ρ =
−
•
    (12a) 
 
and the demand for the variable input (X*) is calculated from 
 
                                                 
11 The adoption of materials as a variable factor in agricultural production is consistent with the findings of 
previous studies, for example, Vasavada and Chambers (1986). 
12 With this method, the stock for a given year is constructed as a weighted sum of the last thirty years of 
expenditures, in which the weights follow an inverted ‘V’ pattern. Huffman and Evenson’s (1989) methodology, 
which consists of a trapezoidal pattern of thirty-five years of expenditures, was also tried. Results show no 
significant differences. 
13 To clarify notation, note that only subscripts in the value function J denote gradient vectors. B and A are 
matrices of parameters. 
14 See Appendix 1 for derivation. 
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In terms of the postulated value function, (12a) and (13a) become 
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where  , P PZA B H = PQ PZB B N = , and u is a 2x2 identity matrix. Note that equations (12b) 
constitute the flexible accelerator with constant adjustment coefficients and can be rewritten 
as in Equation (4) 
)] , ( [ ) , , ( *
_
Q P Z Z M Q P Z Z − =
•
                                              (4b) 
where 
) ( PZ B u M − ρ =  
] [ ) (
1
_
NQ P B B H B u Z PP PZ PZ + + ρ − ρ − =
−  
_
Z being the steady state values of private quasi-fixed inputs. 
The model until now has been described in terms of continuous time. For estimation 
purposes, however, a discrete approximation to   must be used. Z
•
Z -1 being the lag of Z, (12b) 
can be expressed as 
 
c) 12 ( ) (                                               NQ P B B Z B u u H Z PP PZ 1 - PZ ρ + ρ + − ρ + + ρ =  
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Joint estimation of (12c) and (13b) gives all the parameters needed for testing the effects of 




V.  Results 
 
With three private inputs, estimation of the system (12c)-(13b) implies joint estimation 
of three equations: two dynamic demands (for labor and capital) and the demand for the 
variable input. Additionally, the theoretical model implies that public inputs are 
simultaneously determined by P, Z and Y. Therefore, instrumental variables for the public 
inputs must be used. Accordingly, predicted values of G and R were then adopted for 
estimation of (12c)-(13b) by iterative nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions (nonlinear 
ITSUR).
17
Table 1a presents the parameter estimates. The necessary conditions presented in 
Appendix 1 and other regularity conditions of the economic theory can be checked using the 
parameter estimates. The list of conditions include: conditions (B), long-run demand for 
inputs that are decreasing in their own prices and increasing in output, and positive shadow 
prices of public inputs (monotonicity condition in public inputs). Some of the conditions, like 
concavity of the quadratic value function and stability adjustments, can be directly tested and 
checked if they are satisfied globally. Others, however, have to be checked locally at each 
data point. 
                                                 
]
15 This estimation assumes that farmers expect the current input prices to prevail in the future. In this way, 
optimization plans are revised each period when new information is obtained (i.e., when farmers observe the new 
prices). 
16 Note that the theory presented here is a theory of the firm. Nevertheless, the data used for estimation is highly 
aggregated. Consistent linear aggregation would require 
, ) R , G , Y , Z , P ( J ) R , G , Y , Z , P ( J
i
i i ∑ =  
, Z Z
i
i ∑ =  and    ∑ =
i
i Y Y
where the sum is across firms. The linear aggregation is over private quasi-fixed stocks and output because they 
are different across firms. For public inputs, however, this is not required because they are non-rival by 
definition: the same input (as long as they are not local public goods) can be used by many producers at the same 
time. Hence, for the quadratic value function presented above, consistent aggregation across firms requires 
linearity in Z and Y, i.e., JZZ = BZZ = 0, JZY = BZY = 0, and JYY = byy = 0, where BZY is a partition matrix of 
, and b [ ZY ZR ZG ZQ B   B   B B = yy is one element of BQQ. For the estimation presented below aggregation 
conditions were not imposed. When those conditions are imposed, there is no qualitative change in the results. 
17 Instruments include total U.S. population, number of non-farm workers, interest rate of federal bonds, and total 
non-agricultural exports. 
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Nonlinear ITSUR estimates imply that concavity of the value function holds, i.e., the matrix 
Bpp is negative semidefinite. The stability requirement is also satisfied, i.e., the eigenvalues of 
 were inside the unit circle. In terms of the rest of the conditions, conditions 
(B2)(i) and (B2)(ii) for capital exhibit four and thirty-six violations, respectively. While 
violation of (B2)(i) means that the Euler equation does not hold for capital, violation of 
(B2)(ii) implies violation of the adjustment cost condition for that input. Additionally, 
(B2)(iii) is not satisfied for one observation (year 1983), implying negative estimated 
marginal cost for that year. All these condition violations mean that the parameter estimates in 
Table 1A are not consistent with the dynamic theory of the firm. 
) ( PZ B u u − ρ +
Estimated shadow prices of public infrastructure and public R&D by decade are 
presented in Table 2A. A positive shadow price implies that the corresponding public input 
reduces agricultural costs of production. While positive shadow prices of public research were 
obtained for the whole sample period, shadow prices of infrastructure were all negative. 
Hence, the monotonicity condition on public infrastructure is not satisfied, which contradicts 
the assumption of rational government behavior in the provision of this public good. 
In order to obtain reliable estimates consistent with the economic theory of the firm, 
new estimations imposing the set of required conditions were done. Those restrictions imply 
the local imposition of inequality constraints, that is, the restrictions must be imposed at each 
data point.
18 One way of doing this is by using Bayesian estimations to introduce the desired 
conditions as prior beliefs. 
Bayesian estimation entails calculation of the joint posterior distribution of the 
parameters. Analytical calculation of that distribution is, however, not possible, and sampling 
algorithms are generally used to simulate that joint posterior distribution. Recently, different 
algorithms have been developed. This study follows the Metro-Hastings (MH) algorithm, a 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation method that has already been used by 
Griffiths et al. (1999) and O’Donnell et al. (1999) in previous empirical economic studies. 
As other sampling algorithms, the MH simulation method consists of generating draws 
of the parameters of interest from their conditional distribution. Because some restrictions 
need to be imposed in this case, the algorithm contains an accept–reject step in which new 
draws are included in the sample if those conditions are satisfied. In this way, the estimation is 
constrained to the parameter space that is consistent with the economic theory. Additionally, 
                                                 
18 Diewert and Wales (1987) show that, to impose those conditions globally, non-flexible functional forms must 
be adopted. 
  16 
iterations characterized the process in which each random draw is conditioned on the last 
draw. After a certain number of iterations, that process converges to a random sample from 
the joint posterior distribution. The MH parameter estimates are then the mean of that random 
sample.
19
The MH estimation was first done imposing the required conditions on all data points. 
In this case, no draw satisfying all the conditions could be obtained, i.e. the parameter space 
that satisfies the restrictions was empty. The conditions were then relaxed and, due to 
potential measurement errors, they were required to be satisfied only at 80% percent of the 
observations (Atkinson and Dorfman (2001)). Since this relaxation was not enough to get a 
nonempty set, the conditions implied by the Euler equations and adjustment costs were not 
imposed.
20 Table 1B shows then the MH parameter estimates without imposing these two 
conditions. Additionally, convergence of the MH algorithm to the joint posterior distribution 
has been rejected based on the convergence diagnostic developed by Geweke (1992).
21
Using these MH estimates, the value function was negative in the last seven years of 
the sample (i.e., condition (B1) was satisfied in more than 80% of the cases). The Euler 
equation for capital was not satisfied in the first five years, while, for labor, it was not 
satisfied in the first seventeen years. The adjustment-cost condition was not satisfied in thirty-
four years for capital and forty-three years for labor. In contrast, positive shadow prices of 
public inputs were obtained for all data points. It seems, therefore, that forcing the parameter 
estimates to satisfy monotonicity in public inputs makes them difficult to satisfy the Euler 
equations and the adjustment-cost conditions. 
Table 2B presents the shadow prices of public infrastructure and research by decade 
and their respective standard deviations. The shadows are positive for all decades and most of 
them are significantly different from zero. This could be interpreted as a positive contribution 
of public inputs to productivity growth of the US agricultural sector. 
Tables 3B to 5B show the short- and long-run elasticities of demand and the 
elasticities of cost with respect to output. Estimates of the long-run elasticities of demand 
indicate that, while infrastructure has had positive impacts on private capital accumulation, 
public research has substituted for private capital. Finally, elasticities of cost with respect to 
output, even after adjusting for the presence of public inputs, are larger than one, meaning that 
                                                 
19 Appendix 3 presents a brief description of the MH algorithm for Bayesian estimation. A detailed explanation is 
presented in Griffiths et al. (1999) and O’Donnell et al. (1999). 
20 This was determined by trial and error examination of the conditions. It was found that the Euler equation and 
adjustment cost conditions were the conditions more difficult to be satisfied. 
21 See Appendix 3 for details. 
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the US agricultural sector has exhibited decreasing returns to scale, contrary to the postulated 
endogenous growth condition. 
All these results, however, cannot be taken as conclusions of this study given that the 
estimated parameters are not consistent with economic theory and they cannot be interpreted 
as being drawn from the posterior distribution due to no convergence of the iterations. 
Reliability of the data, measurement errors, and aggregation biases could be named as 
possible reasons for those conditions not to be satisfied. Therefore, either the non-sample 
(prior) information (i.e., the restrictions concerning the microeconomic theory of the firm) is 
not correct or the sample information (the available data set of the U.S. agricultural sector) is 
not enough information to successfully obtain the posterior distribution. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has presented a dynamic model to measure the contribution of public inputs 
to productivity growth. Opposite to other studies (for instance, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) 
and Morrison and Schwartz (1996)), this paper rationalizes the public provision of non-rival 
inputs assuming the government is a benevolent social planner that maximizes social welfare. 
Although Binswanger et al. (1993) has considered the public provision of infrastructure 
endogenous to the model, that study is based on a static approach. This paper, in contrast, has 
introduced a dynamic duality model that captures the dynamic characteristic of growth models 
and allows testing for endogenous growth hypotheses. 
The model developed in this paper permits deriving testable hypotheses related to the 
main postulates of a version of endogenous growth theory (‘AK’ models with public goods) 
using duality theory. In particular, two conditions have been postulated and tested. One is the 
existence of increasing returns to scale over all inputs (private and public). The other is the 
positive effect of public inputs on the long-run demand for private factors that can be 
accumulated (steady state stocks of capital). 
The paper by Morrison and Schwartz (1996) shows how to test for increasing returns 
to scale over all factors of production by extending the Le Chatelier principle to the presence 
of public quasi-fixed inputs. In this regard, one contribution of this paper is the derivation of 
the Le Chatelier principle for a dynamic duality model with the presence of factors that are 
external to the firm. Given that those factors are quasi-fixed for the firm, the Le Chatelier 
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principle is still valid in a dynamic model in which all firm-specific inputs can be adjusted in 
the long-run. Therefore, increasing returns to scale over all inputs can still be tested at the 
long-run equilibrium perceived by the firm. 
In terms of the empirical results, the estimates presented in this study do not meet the 
conditions implied by the economic theory of the firm and the assumed rational behavior of 
government. Numerous reasons could be mentioned for this, like data reliability, measurement 
errors, aggregation biases, and model identification. Related to this last reason is the 
possibility that the U.S. agricultural sector has experienced technological changes that have 
been too fast for this empirical model to correctly capture them. Independently of the reason, 
Bayesian estimation allows concluding that either the prior information (i.e., the restrictions 
concerning the microeconomic theory of the firm) is not correct or the sample information 
(the available data set of the U.S. agricultural sector) does not provide enough information to 
successfully obtain the posterior distribution. 
Finally, more work is needed to overcome the limitations of this study. The use of 
time series may cause problems due to the presence of nonstationary data. One way of 
overcoming this problem is to consider a cointegration approach. However, the large number 
of parameters to estimate, relative to the sample size, makes this task difficult. Another 
alternative approach is the use of panel data, estimating the model at the state level. This 
approach can improve this study in both theoretical and econometrical aspects. In terms of 
theoretical aspects, panel estimation at the state level could also allow for the presence of 
spillover effects as well as different patterns of growth in each state. In terms of econometrical 
aspects, a larger number of degrees of freedom is introduced, which, as is well known, 
improves statistical estimations. Clearly, a model introducing panel data to this dynamic 
duality model is the direction to follow. 
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APPENDIX 1 
This appendix presents conditions (A) and (B) that guarantee duality between cost and 
value functions of the firms. 
 
Conditions (A) 
It is assumed that C(y, Z, I; G) satisfies the following set of regularity conditions: 
(A.1)  C(y, Z, I; G) ≥ 0. 
(A.2)  C(y, Z, I; G) is increasing in y and decreasing in Z. Additionally, CI > 0 when I > 0 
and vice versa, which follows from the assumption of adjustment costs. 
(A.3)  C(y, Z, I; G) is convex in I. 
(A.4)  For each (Z0, y, p; G) a unique solution exists for (1). This means that there are well-
defined factor demand functions associated with (1). 
(A.5)  For each (Z0, y, p; G), problem (1) has a unique steady state (SS) stock   that 
is globally stable. This condition establishes the uniqueness and stability of the steady 
state. 
) G ; p , y ( Z
_
(A.6)  For any (Z0, y, p; G), there exists p such that   is the optimal gross investment vector 




0, y, p; G). 
 
Conditions (B) 
It is assumed that the value function J(Z, y, p; G) satisfies the following properties: 
(B.1)  J(Z, y, p; G) ≥ 0. 
(B.2)   (i)   , where u is an identity 
matrix. This expression is dual  to C
0 ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) ru ( zz z < − − δ +
•
z < 0. 
(ii)  Jz(Z, y, p; G) < 0 when   > 0 and vice versa. This 
condition is dual to C
Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( * I δ + ≡
•
I > 0 when I > 0 and vice versa. 
         (iii)  , where 
. This condition is dual to C
0 ) G   p;   y,   Z, ( * Z ) G   p;   y,   Z, ( J ) G   p;   y,   Z, ( J
'
yz y > − ρ
•
] Z ) G   p;   y,   Z, ( J )[ G   p;   y,   Z, ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z p
1
pz − ρ =
−
•
y > 0. 
(B.3)  The following expression is concave in p: 
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) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J Z ' p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J '
z
•
− − ρ  
Under some specific functional forms (like the normalized quadratic presented above), 
Jz(Z, y, p; G) is linear in p and the curvature requirement reduces to concavity of J(Z, 
y, p; G) in p. This condition is dual to (A.3). 
(B.4)  The demand for the variable input, X
*(Z, y, p; G), is positive. 
(B.5)  The stock Z that solves  , with Z(0) 
> 0, has a unique globally stable steady state . 
] Z ) G   p;   y,   Z, ( J )[ G   p;   y,   Z, ( J ) G   p;   y,   Z, ( * Z p
1
pz − ρ =
−
•
) G ; p , y ( Z
_
 
Then, under conditions (A) and (B), duality between C(y, Z, I; G.) and J(Z, y, p; G) 




1.  With respect to I: 
CI(y, Z, I; G) = - Jz(Z, y, p; G). From (A.2) or (B.2.ii), this expression must be positive 
when I > 0 and vice versa. 
Testing for Jz(Z, y, p; G) = 0 is equivalent to testing for adjustment costs in inputs Z. 
 
2.  With respect to Z: 
0 ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J p ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) u ( ) G ; I , Z , y ( C zz z z < − − δ + ρ =
•
from (A.2). 
This expression gives the shadow price of quasi-fixed inputs. 
 
3.  With respect to y: 
0 ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C '
zy y y > − ρ =
•
 from (A.2). 
This expression represents the output supply of the firms. 
 
4.  With respect to p: 
) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J 0 zp p
•
− − ρ =  
Then, 
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] Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J )[ G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z p
1
pz − ρ =
−
•
, which is the dynamic demand for Z. 
 
5.  With respect to G: 
) G ; p , y , Z ( * Z ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C ZG G G
•
− ρ =  
This expression represents the shadow price of G when the firms are out of the SS. At the 
SS, the shadow price is 
) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G ; I , Z , y ( C G G ρ =  
If this expression is negative, the shadow price of G is positive, meaning that public inputs 




This appendix presents conditions (C) to (D) that guarantee duality between the value 
function of the firms and the value function of the government. 
 
Conditions (C) 
It is assumed that J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) satisfies the following conditions: 
(C.1)  J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) ≥ 0 
(C.2)  (i) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is increasing in Ig. Given that J(y, Z, p; G) is independent 
of Ig, AC(Ig) must be increasing in Ig. 
(ii) J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is decreasing in G. Given that AC(Ig) is independent of G, 
J(y, Z, p; G) must be decreasing in G. 
(C.3)  J(y, Z, p; G) + AC(Ig) is convex in Ig. Then, AC(Ig) must be convex in Ig. 
(C.4)  For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists a unique solution for (8). This means that there 
are well-defined supplies of public inputs. 
(C.5)  For each (Z, p, y, r, G0), (8) has a unique steady state stock   that is 
globally stable. 
) r , y , p , Z ( G
_
(C.6)  For any (Z, p, y, r, G0), there exists 
^
r such that   is the optimal public gross 










It is assumed that J
g(y, Z, p; r, G) satisfies the following conditions: 
(D.1)  J
g(y, Z, p; r, G) ≥ 0 
(D.2)  (i)  . This condition is dual to (C.2)(i) and means that there are 
adjustment costs in the provision of public inputs. 
0 ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( J
g
G <
(ii)  . This expression is dual to 
(C.2)(ii): 




G g < − δ + θ
•
0 ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( JG < (positive shadow prices of public inputs). Given 
, it is sufficient for (D.2)(ii) to hold that 
 (that is, increases of the public good decrease the shadow 
price of it). 
0 ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( J
g
G <
0 ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( J
g
GG < −
(D.3)   must be concave in r. This is dual to 
condition (C.3). 






(D.4)   is positive.  G ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( * G ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( I g
*
g δ + ≡
•
(D.5)  The stocks G that solve  ] G ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( J )[ G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( J ) G   r,   p;    Z, y, ( * G g
r
1 g




with G(0) > 0, has a unique globally stable steady state  .  ) r ; y , p , Z ( G
_
 
Then, under conditions (C) and (D), duality between J
g(y, Z, p; r, G) and J(y, Z, p; r, 
G) +AC(Ig) can be established as in equations (9) and (10). The derivative properties 




1.  With respect to Ig: 
) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J AC 0
g
G Ig + =  
or 
0 AC ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J
g I
g
G > = − , 
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This is positive given ACIg > 0. 








G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J r ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) u ( ) G ; p , y , Z (  
This expression is the firms’ willingness to pay for G (shadow pri hen the firms are at 
G
1
g − − δ + θ =
−  
which could be interpreted as a ‘social’ shadow price: the net social benefit (the firms’ 
 
.  With respect to r: 
+
* g





Gr − = θ
−  
which gives the optimal path of G. 
4.  With respect to Z: 
+
* g





z < − =
•
θ  
where the sign is given by condition B.2(ii): the value function of the firm is decreasing in 
5.  With respect to y: 
 
W








G g G J
ce) w
the steady state. If the expression is negative (condition (D.2)(ii)), then public inputs 
reduce cost of production. When the government is also at the SS, that expression can be 
rewritten as 
y;    Z, p, ( J
g
G − ) r ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ( ) u ( ) G   r,  
shadow price of G minus the government’s cost of providing G) adjusted by the ‘social’ 





r G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J







z J ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J
0 G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( Jz
Z. 
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•
θ + = * g
Gy y
g
y G ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( ' J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J  
or 




atistics, the parameters to be estimated are treated as random variables 
associa
 posterior distribution of a 
set of p




y y > − =
•
θ  
y. Finally, at the SS level of G (or with no adjustment cost of G), 
0 ) G   r,   y;    Z, p, ( J ) G ; p , y , Z ( J
g





ted with a subjective probability distribution that describes the state of knowledge 
about the parameters. The knowledge either may exist before observing any sample 
information or might be derived from both prior and sample information. In the former case, 
the associated probability distribution is a prior distribution. In the latter, that distribution is a 
posterior distribution. Thus, different from the classical statistics that concentrates on point 
estimates of a (set of) parameter(s), the objective of Bayesian statistics is usually the 
achievement of the posterior distribution of a (set of) parameter(s). 
Using the Bayesian Theorem, it can be shown that the joint
arameters can be obtained from the combination of sample information and the joint 
prior distribution of the parameters (see Judge et al., 1988). That is, 
) , ( p ) , , ( L ) / , ( f Σ β Σ β y y Σ β ∝        (A3.1) 
where β is the vector of parameters of interest, Σ is their 
sampl
ment of the posterior distribution requires specification of the prior distribution 
and the likelihood function. In the present study, the prior distribution must incorporate the 
variance-covariance matrix, and y is 
the matrix of sample observations. Expression (A.3.1) states that the posterior joint density 
function of β and Σ (i.e., ) / , ( f y Σ β ) is proportional to (‘∝’) the likelihood function  ) , , ( L Σ β y  
(which contains all the information) times the prior density function  
Intuitively, the prior information about the parameters is modified by the available  e 
information (through the likelihood function) to obtain the posterior information about the 
parameters. 
Attain
 sample    ) , ( p Σ β .
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restrictions implied by the economic theory. That is, the assumptions required for the adopted 
economic theory to be true are included as prior beliefs. The prior distribution must then 
assign probability zero to regions of the parameter space that do not meet the restrictions and 
positive probability otherwise. Following O’Donnell et al. (1999), the following non-
informative
22 joint prior distribution was adopted 
) B ( ) B I( ) ( p ) ( p ) , ( p 2
1 N
∈ ∝ ∈ =
+
−
β Σ β Σ β Σ β I      (A3.2) 
where Β is the subspace of parameter vectors that satisfy the restrictions, N is the number of 
equations, and I(β ∈ Β) is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when a given vector of 
parameters β belongs to Β and takes the value 0 otherwise. 
The SUR model to be estimated is  ε + = ) , g( β X y , where the N equations have been 
stacked. To specify the likelihood function, then, a distribution for ε must be assumed. 
Following Judge et al. (1985), it is assume r vector has a multivariate normal 
distribution, i.e.  ) I , 0 ( MVN ~ T ⊗ Σ ε . The likelihood function is then 
d that the erro
)] ( tr   5 . exp[
] , g( - ( ) ( ' , g( - ( 5 . exp[ ) , , ( L
1 2 / T




) ⊗ ) − ∝
AΣ




where A is the N x N symmetric matrix with the (i,j)
th element equal to aij = (yi-g
g(Xj,β)). 
rior distribution is 
(Xi,β))’(yj-
Finally, having specified both the prior distribution and the likelihood function, the 
joint poste
) B (   ] , g( - ( ) ( ' , g( - ( 5 . exp[ ) / , ( f T
1 2 / ) 1 N T (
∈ ) ⊗ ) − ∝
− + + −
β β X y I Σ β X y Σ y Σ β I   (A3.4) 
As in O’Donnell et al. (1999), the interest is on the characteristics of the marginal distribution 
of β and, then, Σ is considered a nuisance parameter that can be integrated out of equation 
(A3.4). This procedure yields 




β A y β I        (A3.5) 
Additional integration of this joint posterior distribution would eventually give the marginal 
distribution of β. However, this is not analytically possible.
                                                
 The way this is overcome is by 
 
22 A non-informative prior distribution is a distribution that does not contain specific information about the 
parameter. Equation (A3.2), form example, does not specify any exact distribution p(β,Σ). If p(β,Σ) is said to be 
a normal distribution, in contrast, then that would be an informative prior distribution. As a consequence of 
adopting a non-informative prior, when this prior is combined with the likelihood function in equation (A3.1), 
the posterior distribution is dominated by the sample information. 
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adopting numerical methods. In particular, computer-intensive algorithms can be implemented 
in the estimation of the marginal distribution. 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms, like the Gibbs sampler and the 
Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm, have recently become very popular in applied 
economics. They constitute a technique for generating random variables from a marginal 
distribution without need of analytically calculating the density (Cassella and George, 1992). 
That is, instead of computing or approximating the posterior distribution  ) f( y β /  directly, 
those algorithms allow generating a sample β
1,…, β
m ~  ) f( y β /  without knowing  ) f( y β / . 
The characteristics of the marginal density can then be calculated with a large enough sample. 
For example, the mean of  ) f( y β /  is calculated using the s ean (Cassella and George, 
1992) 
ample m







m = =∫ ∑ ∞ −
=
∞ →      (A3.6) 
Hence, for a large enough sample size m, any population characteristic can be obtained from 
the generated observations. 
onnell et al. (1999).
23 This algorithm consists of the following 
steps 
 arbitrary starting value of the parameter vector β
i, i = 0, is specified such that the 
constraints are satisfied; that is, β
0 ∈ Β. 
s set equal to zero and the algorithm jumps to step 5). 
The Bayesian results shown in this paper are based on the Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm presented in O’D
 
1)  An
2)  Given β
i, a candidate value for β
i+1, β









4)  If the constraints hold, then α(β
i,β
C) is set equal to min[g(β
C)/ g(β
i), 1], where 








β A I . 
6)  The next value in the s e rule 
                                                
5)  An independent uniform random variable (U) is generated from the interval [0,1]. 
equence, β
i+1, is generated from th
 
23 Detailed theoretical explanation of the Gibbs sampler and the MH algorithm is provided in Cassella and 
George (1992), Chib and Greenberg (1996), Gelfand et al. (1990), Gelfand et al. (1992), and Gelfand and Smith 
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) , (      U if  
C i i ⎪ ⎩
⎨
β β α ≥ β
=  
) , (      U if  
C i C
1 i ⎪ ⎧ β β α < β + β
7)  The value of i is set equal to i+1 (i = i+1), and the procedure continues in step 2. 
 
ed. As in 
’Donnell et al., the following multivariate normal distribution is adopted 
where   is the estimated covariance matrix obtained in the SUR estimation, 
and h is a scalar used to control the size of the ‘step’ in the iteration (
he parameter space
, β
m ~  . In words, after a large enough 
sequen
nd the whole sample (m) had been established. The value of h was set 
equal t
ates do not satisfy 
the con
s, 
however, very sensitive to changes in the starting values. That is, similar to what happened 
                                                                                                                                                        
Note that the symmetric transition density q(β
i,β





1 i C i ] X ) ( ' X [ h , MVN ) , ( q
− − ⊗ = I Σ β β β       (A3.7) 
1
T
1 ] X ) ( ' X [
− − ⊗I Σ
i.e., h gives the rate at 
which t  B is investigated).  
Iteration of this procedure m times gives a sequence of parameter vectors β
1,…, β
m ∈ 
B. For some s < m, the following holds: β
s+1, … ) f( y β /
ce of size s (the ‘burn-in’ period), the m-s final drawings converge, in the sense that 





For estimation purposes, the starting values, the value of the scalar h, and the sizes of 
the ‘burn-in’ period (s) a
o 0.025 after trying different values. The selection was based on the maximum rate at 
which candidate vectors were accepted as the next value in the sequence. For many alternative 
values of h, there was no candidate accepted as next value in the sequence. 
The total number of iterations was m = 110,000. The first 10,000 were used for the 
‘burn-in’ period (s). In terms of the starting values, although the SUR estim
straints (i.e., the estimated vector β does not belong to B), those estimates were used to 
draw an initial value β
0. However, after trying 100,000 draws, no vector satisfied the 
restrictions, implying that the SUR estimates are ‘far’ from the required parameter space B. 
An arbitrary vector β
0 was then chosen such that these starting values satisfy the 
constraints. The existence of candidate vectors β
C such that β
C ∈ B and α(β
i,β
C) > U wa
 
(1990). For empirical implementation, see Atkinson and Dorfman (2001), Griffiths et al. (1999), O’Donnell et al. 
(1999), and Terrel (1996). 
24 The ‘burn-in’ period guarantees two characteristics of the sub-sample of size m-s used to estimate β. First, the 
last m-s observations are effectively drawn from f(β/y). Second, those observations are independent from the 
starting value (Chib and Greenberg, 1996). 
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with al
0,000 observations, while s2 is composed by the last 50,000 observations. A 
likeliho
                                                
ternative values of h, the case B = {β
0} has been the result in many runs that tried 
different starting values. Additionally, when some restrictions on the set B were relaxed,
25 
only 34 out of 100,000 iterations satisfy both β
C ∈ B and α(β
i,β
C) > U, implying that β
i+1 = β
i 
in almost all the iterations. Given this available data set (the sample information), it seems that 
the set B is very restricted and narrow. Consequently, it is difficult to get a reliable posterior 
distribution. 
Finally, convergence of the distribution was checked by taking two sub-samples, s1 
and s2, of the last m-s iterations and comparing their means. The sub-sample s1 is composed 
by the first 1
od ratio test to compare the mean vectors of the two sub-samples was performed. 
Results indicate that equality of the mean vectors is rejected, meaning that the iterations have 
not converged. Increasing the size of the burn-in period and the total number of iterations did 
not change the result of the convergence test. The MH parameter estimates, then, cannot be 
said to characterize the marginal distribution  ) f( y β / . 
 
25 In particular, the Euler equations and the adjustment cost conditions. 
 




         
Parameter Estimate t  Value Parameter Estimate t  Value 
                 
hk -0.05576 -0.66ag -0.00003 -0.41
bpkk 0.142348 3.66ar -0.02087 -0.40
bplk 0.16427 1.32ay 481.825 1.52
bpkL -0.04882 -3.76bkk -6.57309 -0.60
bplL 0.244829 5.25bkL -15.7573 -2.78
bpkpk -2.13166 -2.21bkg -6.87E-06 -0.80
bpkpl 4.332687 1.89bkr 0.015036 1.65
bplpl -26.9784 -2.85bky -95.7818 -3.13
nkg 8.10E-08 3.76bLL -6.57994 -1.26
nkr -0.0001 -6.01bLg 3.48E-06 0.27
nky 0.205884 3.10bLr -0.00568 -0.54
hl 0.346815 1.39bLy -18.3036 -0.66
nlg -1.66E-08 -0.28bgg 1.29E-11 0.37
nlr 9.21E-06 0.18bgr -1.37E-08 -0.61
nly -0.0178 -0.10bgy 0.000049 0.51
a0 -268.873 -1.76brr 5.01E-06 0.28
ak 105.181 2.67bry 0.019253 0.33
aL 47.76673 1.51byy 482.802 1.30
             
Equation  Adj R-Sq.  D-W        
Qk 0.975 1.98       
QL 0.996 2.05       
Qm  0.798 1.96        
 
  30 
 
Table 2A 
Shadow Prices based on ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade 
Decade P*g  P*r 
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Table 3A 
Short-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade 
      
Decade EKG_SR EKR_SR ELG_SR ELR_SR EMG_SR EMR_SR
        
1949-1959 -0.00320  0.00163 0.00573 -0.00678 -0.19251 0.34572 
      
1960-1969 -0.00593  0.00229 0.01569 -0.01409 -0.34502 0.49375 
      
1970-1979 -0.01534  0.00492 0.05827 -0.04354 -3.07294 5.80969 
      
1980-1989 -0.03504  0.01594 0.16666 -0.17651 -1.70414 5.23461 
      




Long-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade 
        
Decade EKG_LR EKR_LR ELG_LR ELR_LR EMG_LR EMR_lR
        
1949-1959  -0.0052 0.0015 -0.0494 0.0582 -0.0542  -0.3770 
        
1960-1969  -0.0093 0.0021 -0.1214 0.1086 0.0562  -0.1892 
        
1970-1979  -0.0227 0.0042 -0.4690 0.3491 0.7331  -0.3488 
        
1980-1989  -0.0543 0.0143 -1.0949 1.1555 1.7980  -1.3611 
        
1990-1994  -0.0874 0.0289 -1.7906 2.3675 2.4069  -2.9955 
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Table 5A 
Adjusted Elsticity of Cost with Respect to Output 
ITSUR Estimates 
Average By Decade 
       
Decade  εcy εcg εgy εcr εry ε
A
cy
       
1949-1959 6.0191  0.0162  -11.6249 -0.3326  -12.7337 10.0654 
       
1960-1969 3.3421  0.1955  -7.1423  -0.2877  -10.2991  4.9092 
       
1970-1979  1.6886 0.9398 -3.0628 -0.5372 -5.3083 1.6617 
       
1980-1989  2.9251 2.7906 -1.6174 -2.4054 -1.9774 3.1680 
       
1990-1994  5.0124 4.2069 -1.3134 -5.3131 -1.2816 6.2965 
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Table 1B 
MH Parameter Estimates 
      
Parameter  Estimate  t Value  Parameter  Estimate  t Value 
      
hk -0.05068  -2.06 ag 0.000032 1.76 
bpkk 0.252834  13.34 ar  -0.01231 -1.19 
bplk -0.05284  -16.27 ay  -259.881 -1.70 
bpkL 0.415566  2.89 bkk  -0.8161 -0.37 
bplL 0.178916  6.93 bkL  2.563959 1.84 
bpkpk -1.49199  -2.12 bkg  2.41E-06 0.92 
bpkpl 4.119652  5.28 bkr  -0.00177 -0.80 
bplpl -38.4536  -5.33 bky  15.13473 1.68 
nkg -1.27E-09  -0.22 bLL 1.751193 0.90 
nkr 2.63E-06  0.59 bLg -0.00001 -1.83 
nky -0.0221  -2.75 bLr  0.009502 1.90 
hl 0.612025  3.33 bLy  20.56857 1.31 
nlg 3.80E-09  0.19 bgg  2.77E-11 1.79 
nlr -3.5E-05  -1.41 bgr  -8.65E-08 -9.44 
nly 0.155178  2.19 bgy -0.00002 -1.55 
a0 134.2401  1.59 brr 8.61E-06 1.97 
ak -19.6675  -1.88 bry  -0.00926 -1.02 
aL -22.1636  -1.30 byy  1274.933 9.22 
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Table 2B 
Shadow Prices of Public Inputs 
MCMC Estimates 
Average By Decade 
Decade P*g  P*r 
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Table 3B 
Short-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods - MCMC Estimation 
Average By Decade 
        
Decade EKG_SR EKR_SR ELG_SR ELR_SR EMG_SR EMR_SR
        
1949-1959 0.001024  -0.00314  -0.000064 0.000209 -0.055511 0.0165787 
  (0.004361) (0.004948) (0.000521) (0.000369) (1.911529) (1.6393535) 
1960-1969 0.001571 -0.010085 -0.000274 0.000395 0.227909  -0.201544 
  (0.008291) (0.007133) (0.001304) (0.000703) (0.665811) (0.4454666) 
1970-1979 0.004234 -0.022613 -0.000945 0.001136 0.351909  -0.398083 
  (0.022389) (0.016082) (0.004381) (0.001967) (0.437095) (0.2141283) 
1980-1989 0.009688 -0.073346 -0.002552 0.004348 0.319634  -2.875702 
  (0.051173) (0.052028) (0.011634) (0.007419) (1.412777) (0.7075312) 
1990-1994 0.01524 -0.144549  -0.004074 0.008698 1.854532 7.7162574 




Long-Run Elasticities of Demand for Private Inputs 
w/ Respect to Public Goods 
Average By Decade 
       
Decade EKG_LR EKR_LR ELG_LR ELR_LR EMG_LR EMR_lR
       
1949-1959  0.002857 -0.00876 0.000498 -0.00163 -0.01863 -0.01004 
 (0.00027)  (0.000829)  (1.65E-05) (5.38E-05) (0.004214) (0.004425) 
1960-1969  0.002366 -0.01567 0.001421 -0.00252 -0.01692 -0.03368 
 (0.000284)  (0.001882)  (3.88E-05) (6.87E-05) (0.009149) (0.004084) 
1970-1979  0.006648 -0.03662 0.00399 -0.00588 -0.06431 -0.17719 
 (0.000803)  (0.004426)  (0.000134) (0.000198) (0.043828) (0.016638) 
1980-1989 0.016232  -0.12677  0.00912  -0.01906  -1.1995  -2.01438 
 (0.002087)  (0.016297)  (0.000295) (0.000617) (0.34993) (0.200925) 
1990-1994  0.022502 -0.22018 0.015937 -0.04173 4.580564 6.403403 
 (0.001775)  (0.017371)  (0.000547) (0.001433) (1.311022) (1.783446) 
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Table 5B 
Adjusted Elsticity of Cost with Respect to Output - MCMC Estimation 
Average By Decade 
       
Decade  εcy εcg εgy εcr εry ε
A
cy
       
1949-1959 2.08066  -0.01931 17.12097 -0.00999  0.74827  1.74257 
 (0.088874) (0.005226)  (11.76344) (0.005263) (39.3168)  (0.444036) 
1960-1969  2.278679 -0.02102 1.315998 -0.03838 2.884776 2.140291 
 (0.112834) (0.009346)  (7.227383) (0.005559) (31.79968) (1.553354) 
1970-1979  2.581448 -0.07948 0.564339 -0.20971 1.486848 2.224795 
 (0.155223) (0.048143)  (3.099318) (0.028902) (16.38993) (3.945232) 
1980-1989  10.46272 -2.54554 0.298008 -4.15066 0.553867 7.405213 
 (40.29378) (13.01153)  (1.63664)  (15.19929) (6.105425) (93.66995) 
1990-1994  -5.87366 3.100688 0.241997 4.283043 0.358983 -3.58576 
 (0.954618) (0.679007)  (1.329035) (0.609656) (3.95717) (17.70768) 
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